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Abstract
Hypothetico-deductive (H-D) confirmation builds on the idea that con-
firming evidence consists of successful predictions that deductively follow
from the hypothesis under test. This article reviews scope, history and
recent development of the venerable H-D account: First, we motivate the
approach and clarify its relationship to Bayesian confirmation theory. Sec-
ond, we explain and discuss the tacking paradoxes which exploit the fact
that H-D confirmation gives no account of evidential relevance. Third, we
review several recent proposals that aim at a sounder and more compre-
hensive formulation of H-D confirmation. Finally, we conclude that the
reputation of hypothetico-deductive confirmation as outdated and hope-
less is undeserved: not only can the technical problems be addressed sat-
isfactorily, the hypothetico-deductive method is also highly relevant for
scientific practice.
Keywords: hypothetico-deductive confirmation, severe tests, Bayesianism,
relevant logical entailment, tacking paradoxes.
1 Introduction
Scientific hypotheses need, if they are supposed to be of any use, to be cali-
brated with the empirical world. The details of this process are, however, the
subject of considerable discussion: How do data contribute to the assessment
of a hypothesis? When do they undermine a hypothesis, and when do they
confirm it? Can we formalize an intuitive, precise and accessible confirmation
relation between hypothesis and data?
Answering these questions leads to important philosophical insights: first, we
develop a practically useful assessment tool for the impact of data on a hypoth-
esis; second, we improve our understanding of how science works and proceeds;
third, the conclusions affect more general questions, such as the problem of
induction and learning from experience.
This article introduces a particular appraoch to assessing theories in the
light of empirical data, namely the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) account of sci-
entific confirmation.1 H-D confirmation takes a particular logical structure to
be characteristic of evidential support: We form a hypothesis on the basis of
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Light exhibits wavelike behavior. (Hypothesis)
A beam of light passes through two slits in an opaque
plate.
(Background assumption)
The light is recorded on a screen behind the plate. (Background assumption)
When sent through two slits, waves exhibit interfer-
ence patterns.
(Background assumption)
An interference pattern is displayed on the screen. (Observation report)
Table 1: Young’s double-slit experiment, interpreted as a case of H-D confirma-
tion.
the available evidence. If empirical predictions that are deduced from that hy-
pothesis turn out to be successful, it is confirmed. An early description of that
approach was given by William Whewell:
Our hypotheses ought to foretel phenomena which have not yet been
observed... the truth and accuracy of these predictions were a proof
that the hypothesis was valuable and, at least to a great extent, true.
(Whewell 1847, 62-63)2
Science often seems to proceed that way: Einstein famously came up with the
General Theory of Relativity (GTR) both for general theoretical reasons and
for solving longstanding observational problems, such as the anomalies in the
perihelion of Mercury. Besides explaining away those anomalies, his new theory
also predicted that light would be bent by massive bodies like the sun. The vin-
dication of Einstein’s forecasts by Eddington during the 1919 eclipse contributed
a lot to the general acceptance of GTR.
A more recent example: Our best theories about the atmospheric system
suggest that emissions of greenhouse gases such as CO2 and Methane lead to
global warming. That hypothesis has been vindicated by its successful (qual-
itative) predictions, such as shrinking arctic ice sheets, increasing global tem-
peratures, its ability to backtrack temperature variations in the past, etc. The
hypothetico-deductive concept of confirmation explicates the common idea of
these and similar examples by stating that evidence confirms a hypothesis if
we can derive it from the tested hypothesis, together with suitable background
assumptions. Another intuition that supports the H-D view contends that suc-
cessful prediction is epistemically superior to successful accommodation of a
hypothesis; we have reasons to prefer hypotheses that have been predictively
successful over those that we fit ad hoc to the data (Worrall 1989, Hitchcock
and Sober 2004).
A nice illustration of the H-D approach is Young’s classical double-slit ex-
periment (figure 1). A beam of light is shot at an opaque plate that has two
open slits in it. Behind the plate, there is a white screen where the light that
passes through the slits is recorded. If light is indeed a wave, we expect that
wave fronts emerge from each slit, propagate in concentric circles, interfere with
each other and yield an interference pattern that is characteristic of a wave. In-
deed, when both slits are open, we see such an interference pattern – a pattern
of alternating light and dark bands on the screen (see figure 1). Background
assumptions and the hypothesis under test work together to yield predictions
that, if vindicated, confirm the wave nature of light. See table 1.
The employed scheme of reasoning can then be written as
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Figure 1: The setup of Young’s famous doubleslit experiment.
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Definition 1 E H-D-confirms H relative to K if and only if
• H.K is consistent,
• H.K entails E (H.K |= E),
• K alone does not entail E.
In this definition, the second condition reflects the basic H-D intuition (hy-
pothesis and background knowledge entail the evidence) whereas the other con-
ditions make additional, but evidently sensible requirements: the hypothesis
under test must not contradict what we already know, and the evidence must
be informative and not already be contained in the background knowledge.
The reader may have noted that the above definition is very close to a
Popperian account of scientific corroboration/confirmation3, and quite different
from Bayesian accounts, which dominate the recent literature on confirmation.
The next section will therefore contrast hypothetico-deductive and Bayesian
confirmation and argue that the former is, although purely qualitative, not
outdated in a time where statistical methods gain more and more terrain in the
sciences. After that, we will review a series of objections to H-D confirmation
before proceeding to solution proposals and a final evaluation.
2 Popper, Bayes and H-D Confirmation
Bayesianism is the main competitor to H-D confirmation, and generally per-
ceived to be the most attractive account of confirmation in philosophy of sci-
ence. It is a quantitative account of confirmation where degree of support is
explicated as increase in degree of belief in the hypothesis under test. These
degrees of belief are, on the pain of exposing the agent to a sure loss, supposed
to conform to the probability calculus. This allows for a natural application
of Bayesianism to statistical data analysis, as well as for transferring Bayesian-
ism to the confirmation of non-probabilistic scientific theories. Assuming that
scientists hold a certain degree of belief in the theory they would like to test.
Then, the degree of support/confirmation corresponds to the credibility boost
that the tested hypothesis experiences in the face of the evidence.
This is, of course, not the place for a detailed review of Bayesian inference,
but a couple of things should be noted to be able to compare it to the H-D
account. First of all, it is a decidedly subjective account where prior opinions
on the hypotheses under test play a major role. Scientists may differ in their
beliefs, and the theory does not provide grounds for rejecting apparently extreme
prior opinions (and posterior conclusions) as irrational. Even strong evidence
does not automatically necessitate the endorsement or rejection of a specific
hypothesis. This problem is especially pressing in policy-related contexts (e.g.,
the global warming hypothesis) where objectivity is a major requirement and
where the data are supposed to yield unambiguous policy advice.
Moreover, many scientific models are highly idealized, and the idea of having
a degree of belief in the truth of a hypothesis might just not be applicable
(Frame et al. 2007). This makes it hard to see which conclusions are justified
by a Bayesian analysis, and how it bears on public policy. Overall, subjective
theories of confirmation like Bayesianism fail, despite all their virtues, to explain
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why there is often consensus on the strength of a confirmatory argument even
when the relevant degrees of belief are controversial. Rather than explicating
the structure of confirmatory arguments, a Bayesian analysis measures their
effects. In particular, evidence often seems to confirm a theory in virtue of
certain objective, logical relations, whereas increase in degree of belief – the
Bayesian explicatum of empirical confirmation – is only an epiphenomenon of
that relation (Glymour 1980a). Thus, Bayesianism remains a useful tool for
quantifying the strength of a support relation, but it does not deliver insights
into the structure of evidential support. A subjective, Bayesian account of
confirmation can, despite all its advantages, not be the whole story.
The above remarks motivate the search for a structural, ‘objective’ account
of confirmation in science. The H-D account might be a suitable candidate
since philosophers and scientists often see explanatory and predictive success,
and severe testing of a hypothesis, as essential to evidential support. Even
in the modern statistical literature, the aforementioned problems with applying
Bayesian reasoning have prompted the question of whether a statistically refined
hypothetico-deductive account might not be more appropriate for making evi-
dential inferences (Gelman and Shalizi 2011): instead of assigning probabilities
to hypotheses, we rather subject them to a battery of statistical tests in order
to determine whether they are statistically adequate. This view is very close
to the H-D account and makes it an attractive blueprint for those statisticians
and philosophers of science who are, like Popper (1934/71) and Mayo (1996),
skeptical about Bayesian updating as a model for scientific theory choice, and
who believe in the importance of severe tests for grounding empirical support.
Moreover, that fact distinguishes the H-D account among qualitative accounts
of confirmation, e.g. vis-a`-vis Hempel’s (1945/65) satisfaction account.
Severe testing is, of course, also a key term in Karl Popper’s philosophy of
science. Indeed, the historic roots of the H-D method are close to those of the
falsificationist methodology: hypotheses have to undergo severe tests, and if
the predicted facts fail to obtain, we reject the hypothesis as falsified (Popper
1934/71). On the other hand, we also want to assess hypotheses which have
not been refuted. Here, the concept of confirmation comes in. Popper denied
that genuine confirmation consisted in raising the credibility of a hypothesis,
as many of his colleagues in the Carnapian school did, but he affirmed that it
made sense to evaluate hypotheses on an empirical basis, to talk of confirmation,
or even degree of confirmation (Popper 1954, 1958), as the extent to which a
hypothesis has survived severe tests. The degree of confirmation is determined
by many details – number of successful predictions, variety of evidence, severity
of tests, empirical content of the hypotheses –, but in any case, hypotheses have
to be tested by deriving evidential consequences (Popper 1934/71, 212-213). In
this sense, the hypothetico-deductive method can guide scientific research even
in the realm of statistics. I will say a little bit more on this topic in the final
section.
At this point, it should be clear that the H-D account is a serious alternative
to the standard Bayesian approaches, and that it might be the best formal model
for capturing the Popperian intuitions about scientific confirmation, progress
and theory choice. The remaining parts of this paper explicate the hypothetico-
deductive account in more detail and explore to what extent this Popperian
account of confirmation can deal with major challenges such as the tacking
paradoxes.
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3 Objections to H-D Confirmation
The hypothetico-deductive scheme of reasoning described in definition 1 has
more or less dominated the discussion of qualitative accounts of confirmation.
For example, H-D confirmation can handle the notorious raven paradox much
better than one of its main competitors, Hempel’s satisfaction criterion. On the
H-D account, the observation of a black raven (Ba.Ra) is not entailed by the
raven hypothesis (H = ∀x : Rx → Bx). But if we know that we are going to
observe ravens and check their color (K = Ra.Rb.Rc. . . .), then the observation
that a particular raven is black (E = Ra.Ba) is implied by H.K and thus con-
firms the hypothesis that all ravens are black, in line with our intuitions. Using
the same scheme, we see that observing a white crow (E′ = ¬Ra.¬Ba) can
confirm the raven hypothesis, if we condition on the appropriate background
knowledge that the observed object is not black (K ′ = ¬Ba). On this reading,
E′ confirms the raven hypothesis relative to K ′, in line with Hempel’s (1945/65)
intuition that we are ruling out potential counterexamples to the raven hypoth-
esis, namely grey or white birds that might turn out to be ravens instead of
crows. Whereas Hempel’s own criterion fails to reconstruct this intuition: even
if a is known not to be a raven, the observation statement ¬Ba.¬Ra still Hempel-
confirms that all ravens are black (Fitelson 2006; Fitelson and Hawthorne 2010).
However, H-D confirmation is troubled by a number of objections. We first
mention an attempted reductio ad absurdum by Clark Glymour (1980b). As-
sume that evidence E and hypothesis H are contingent and consistent with
each other, and that we believe evidence E to be true. Then, the (contingent)
truth of E implies the (contingent) truth of the material conditional H → E
for an arbitrary H, so we can add that formula – the logical consequence of
a statement to believed true – to our background knowledge. But relative to
H → E, E can be derived from H, so E H-D-confirms H relative to H → E.
So an arbitrary H is H-D-confirmed by any true evidence E, leading to the
famous conclusion that H-D confirmation is ‘hopeless’. However, Glymour’s ob-
jection misconstrues the relation between evidence and background knowledge:
the latter is no independent knowledge, but derived from the evidence. Glymour
doubly counts the evidence, by inferring from evidence E to the assumptions
which serve as a background for evaluating whether the same E confirms the
hypothesis. This kind of bootstrapping is, of course, not admissible, and we can
safely reject Glymour’s pessimistic conclusion.
Another classical objection concerns the vulnerability of H-D confirmation to
the holistic challenge that was articulated by Duhem (1906) and Quine (1951).
Since no single hypothesis can be tested in isolation, it seems that no single hy-
pothesis ever entails an empirical prediction. Thus, it cannot be H-D confirmed.
This seems to amount to a reductio of the hypothetico-deductive model. But
actually, our distinction between hypothesis under test (H) and hypotheses in
use (K) takes care of that problem: it is acknowledged that H can only be H-D
confirmed relative to a set of auxiliary hypotheses K, but then, we can again
test the claims in K against other parts of the theory to which it belongs, and
thus pull ourselves up by our own bootstraps (Morrison 2010).4
The greatest challenge for H-D confirmation is certainly a family of ob-
jections anticipated by Hempel (1945/65), in his discussion of the Converse
Consequence Condition: the tacking paradoxes. The idea is that irrelevant
conjunctions are deliberately tacked to the hypothesis H while preserving the
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confirmation relation: If H is confirmed by a piece of evidence E (relative to
any K), H.X is confirmed by the same E for an arbitrary X that is consistent
with H and K. We can easily check the three conditions for H-D confirma-
tion: First, by assumption, H.K.X is consistent. Second, if H.K |= E then
also H.K.X |= E because logical implication is monotonous with regard to the
antecedens. Third, K alone does not entail E because we already know that E
H-D-confirms H relative to K. Thus, tacking an arbitrary irrelevant conjunct
to a confirmed hypothesis preserves the confirmation relation. It is easy to see
that this is highly unsatisfactory: Assume that the wave nature of light is con-
firmed by Young’s double slit experiment. According to the H-D account of
confirmation, this implies that the following hypothesis is confirmed: ‘Light is
an electromagnetic wave and Earth is a disc.’ This sounds completely absurd.
More generally, H-D confirmation needs an answer to why a piece of evidence
does not confirm every theory that implies it.
The above problem has a counterpart on the side of the evidence. Tacking
irrelevant disjunctions to the evidence E equally preserves the confirmation
relation: If E confirms a hypothesis H, E ∨E′ H-D-confirms the same H for an
arbitrary E′ (unless K logically implies E∨E′). The core of the problem is that
if H.K |= E, then also H.K |= E ∨ E′, preserving the deductive relationship
between theory and evidence. Again, this tacking problem has unacceptable
consequences (Gemes 1993, 1998; Moretti 2006). The hypothesis ‘Light is an
electromagnetic wave’ is H-D-confirmed by the observations in the double-slit
experiment (the interference pattern on the screen). Hence, it is also confirmed
by Young’s experimental observations or the observation that the Eiffel Tower
is in Paris is 324 meter high. This is as absurd as the tacking of arbitrary
conjunctions. Both objections exploit the fact that classical H-D confirmation
gives no account of evidential relevance. That would, if unanswered, be lethal
for H-D confirmation. The debate around these paradoxes has been going on
for decades, with most contributions being published in the journal Erkenntnis.
The next section presents solution proposals for this refractory paradox.
4 Solution Proposals for the Tacking Proposals
Most solution proposals try to rule out the tacking paradoxes by an account
of relevant entailment in first-order predicate logic.5 This simple language is
suitable for developing solution ideas that can subsequently be transferred to
more complicated languages. Early attempts have been made by Horwich (1982)
and Grimes (1990); however, they fail to provide a general solution, as pointed
out by Gemes (1993, 1998). These failures have even prompted the reaction that
taking care of the tacking paradoxes is an unattainable goal (Moretti 2006). But
that opinion is way too pessimistic. The first feasible proposal has been made
by Gerhard Schurz (1991, 1994). His criterion is based on the replaceability of
a well-formed formula in the consequens of a logical implication. Consider, for
example, the logical implication Fa |= Fa.Fb. Obviously, we can replace Fb
by Gb, ¬Hb or any other formula without invalidating the logical implication.
Thus, Fb is irrelevant for the inference in question whereas we cannot replace
Fa in the consequens salva validitate by any other formula. This observation
gives rise to a theory of irrelevant conclusions (Schurz 1991, 409):
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Definition 2 Assume Γ |= φ. φ is a relevant conclusion of Γ if and only if no
predicate in φ is replaceable on some of its occurrences by any other predicate
of the same arity, salva validitate of Γ |= φ. Otherwise, φ is an irrelevant
conclusion of Γ.
An analogous, yet more complicated definition can be made for irrelevant
premises (Schurz 1991). Having achieved that, it is natural to require that in
H-D confirmation, the crucial entailment H.K |= E in the definition of H-D
confirmation have neither irrelevant premises nor irrelevant conclusions:
Definition 3 E H-D-confirms H relative to K according to Schurz if and only
if
• the three conditions of the original definition of H-D definition are satis-
fied,
• the entailment H.K |= E has neither irrelevant premises nor an irrelevant
conclusion.
In this definition, the tacking paradoxes vanish due to the replaceability
salva veritate criterion, as the readers are invited to check themselves. So
Schurz’ account seems to deal well with the standard objections to hypothetico-
deductive confirmation. A problem of that account is, though, the lack of in-
variance of this account of confirmation under logical equivalence. For instance,
in ∀x : Fx |= Fa, the (relevant) conclusion Fa is logically equivalent to Fa∨Fa
which is no relevant conclusion of ∀x : Fx. Confirmation relations should not
depend on the way a theory (or an observation report) is formulated as long as
the content remains the same. To cope with this problem, Schurz has proposed a
number of technical modifications that I cannot review in detail, but they come
at the expense of elegance and transparency. Moreover, there are a couple of
minor objections (Gemes 1994b, 1998), such as the fact that ∀x : Fx is not H-D-
confirmed according to Schurz by Ga relative to the ‘bridge law’ ∀x : (Fx→ Gx)
due to premise irrelevancy. While Schurz gives the first sustainable solution in
the literature, his revised account also leaves room for improvement.
An alternative tool is the idea of relevant models, i.e. models of the conse-
quens that assign truth values to the ‘relevant’ atomic wffs only. So relevant
models of Fa ∨ Fb would be those models that assign ‘true’ to both Fa and
Fb, or ‘true’ to one formula and ‘false’ to the other, and no truth values to
any other wffs (see appendix A for details). On that basis, Grimes (1990) pro-
poses to amend hypothetico-deductive confirmation by the requirement that at
least one relevant model of the consequens be consistent with all models of the
antecedens.6 This idea meets the tacking by disjunction paradox, but it runs,
unfortunately, into straightforward counterexamples: Fa ∨ ¬Fb would, on that
account, H-D-confirm the hypothesis H = ∀x : Fx (Gemes 1993, footnote 4),
but it is certainly not a relevant prediction of H, nor is it part of the proper
content of H.
This idea of the content of a hypothesis is central to Ken Gemes’ proposal.
He modifies Grimes’ suggestion by demanding that in a relevant logical entail-
ment, all relevant models of the consequens (and not only one model) can be
extended to relevant models of the antecedens:
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Definition 4 For two wffs α and β, β is a content part of α (α |=cp β) if and
only if
• α and β are contingent,
• α logically entails β,
• every relevant model of β has an extension which is a relevant model of α.
In other words, β is a content part of α if α logically implies β and if we can
extend β to a model of the antecedens α by assigning truth values to further
wffs. Indeed, the content part relation easily discerns irrelevant conclusions.
For instance, Fa ∨Ga is no content part of Fa because the model that assigns
‘false’ to Fa and ‘true’ to Ga is a relevant model of Fa ∨ Ga but no model of
Fa. Such deductions are marked as irrelevant.
From the above examples, it is clear that replacing H.K |= E by H.K |=cp E
in the definition of H-D confirmation would resolve the tacking by disjunction
paradox. But what about tacking by conjunction – the problem of irrelevant
premises? The content part definition merely applies to one side of the problem.
Therefore Gemes also introduces the notion of a natural axiomatization of a
theory T (=the antecedens) where
only those content parts of T that play a role in the derivation of
E can be confirmed by E. In doing so it provides for the type of
selective confirmation without which H-D would [...] be hopeless.
(Gemes 1993, 483–484)
Gemes (1993) gives a technical definition and demonstrates that this ap-
proach takes care of the tacking by conjunction problem. Using both the notion
of content part and of a natural axiomatization, he then achieves the following
refined definition of H-D confirmation:
Definition 5 E H-D-confirms axiom A of theory T relative to K according to
Gemes if and only if
• E is a content part of A.K (A.K |=cp E),
• there is no natural axiomatization N(T ) of T so that for some set S ⊂
N(T ), E is a content part of (K.
∧
S∈S S) and A is not a content part of
(K.
∧
S∈S S).
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This account of H-D confirmation works, on a whole, fine (Park 2004; Gemes
2005; Schurz 2005). But there are a couple of drawbacks. First, it is not clear
which axiomatizations should count as ‘natural’ and which not. For instance,
if A, B and C denote first-order sentences, the sentence (A → B).(B.C → A)
cannot be ‘naturally’ decomposed into its two conjuncts. Second, couldn’t it
make sense to test a scientific hypothesis even if there is no theory of which it
is a natural axiom? Third, Definition 5 is rather complicated and hard to inter-
pret intuitively, so much the more as the definition supervenes on the complex
concept of natural axioms.
Keeping in mind Carnap’s requirement that explications should be as simple
and intuitive as possible, it is fair to say that we should continue our search. In
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the next section, we will supply a refined definition of H-D confirmation that
explores how an entire theory can be H-D confirmed, without referring to a
particular axiomatization.
5 Theory Confirmation
Sometimes, we want to confirm interrelated collectives of scientific hypotheses,
such as Kepler’s three laws of planetary motion, or Maxwell’s laws of electrody-
namics. There, relevant background assumptions that we use in testing a single
hypothesis can be part of the overarching theory. The question is then: Can
we define an account of H-D confirmation where such theories are confirmed
as a whole, without reference to a particular axiomatization? This would not
only be an attractive formal result, but also a interesting reply to the holistic
challenge outlined in section three.
The first thing to do is to find a way to rule out tacking by conjunction
without using natural axiomatizations. We propose to combine content parts
and modus tollens in order to discern irrelevant conjunctions. The basic idea of
H-D confirmation – that E is a prediction of H – can be expressed in two ways:
H |= E and ¬E |= ¬H. The latter formulation states that failure to observe a
prediction refutes a hypothesis. This refers back to the falsificationist intuitions
from which H-D confirmation emerged: the evidence has to put the hypothesis
to a serious test. We now qualify this modus tollens entailment by means of
content parts and restrict it to the domain of the evidence, i.e. the individual
constants about which we make observational statements:
¬E.K |=cp ¬H|dom(E).K. (1)
Here, H|dom(E) denotes the development of H to the domain of E, as defined by
Hempel (1943, 1945/65). For instance, the domain of Fa.Fb is {a, b} whereas
the domain of Fa.Ga is {a}. More precisely, the domain of a wff α, denoted by
dom(α), is the set of singular terms which occur in the atomic (!) well-formed
formulas (wffs) of L that are relevant for α.
Then, the problem of irrelevant conjunctions becomes a variant of the prob-
lem of irrelevant disjunctions which the content part relation is able to resolve:
if H is the compound of a ‘relevant’ and an ‘irrelevant’ hypothesis, then the con-
tent part relation will not hold between ¬E.K and ¬H|dom(E).K. For example,
if E = Fa, H = (∀x : Fx).(∀x : Gx) and K = >, then H|dom(E).K = ¬Fa∨¬Ga
is no content part of ¬E.K = ¬Fa.
That intuition can be generalized to the case of theory confirmation. We
stipulate that evidence E H-D confirms a theory T if (i) we can derive that
evidence from the theory (relative to background knowledge), and (ii) there
is a decomposition of T into content parts H1, . . . ,Hn such that each Hi is
potentially affected by predictive failure of the experiment. An experiment tests
an entire theory if and only if content parts of the theory that jointly entail the
whole theory are simultaneously subjected to a severe test. This reasoning can
be condensed into the following definition:
Definition 6 Evidence E H-D-confirms theory T relative to background knowl-
edge K if and only if
• E is a content part of T.K (T.K |=cp E)
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• There are wffs H1, . . . ,Hn such that H1, . . . ,Hn |= T and for all i ≤ n,
T |=cp Hi, and there is a wff Ei such that
– E |=cp Ei
– ¬(Hi)|dom(Ei).K is a content part of ¬Ei.K, or in other words, ¬Ei.K |=cp
¬(Hi)|dom(Ei).K.
This final definition has a number of desirable implications (see Sprenger
2010 for details). It solves all tacking paradoxes, dispenses with natural axiom-
atizations, and gives an account of how entire theories can be confirmed in the
H-D style using only a single concept: content part entailment, a refinement of
deductive entailment. A fortiori, we can also apply it to the confirmation of
single hypotheses. Thus, the proposal is considerably simpler, more general in
scope than the rivalling suggestions of Gemes and Schurz, and arguably the best
available model of H-D confirmation. Whether it will survive all objections is,
however, a question that only the future can answer.
6 Final Discussion
This article has motivated H-D confirmation from its roots in the falsification-
ist philosophy of Karl R. Popper, and sketched its way through the history of
the 20th and early 21th century. Outside the circles of confirmation theorists,
hypothetico-deductivism is often considered to be an easy prey of various para-
doxes and objections, or at least inferior to other accounts of confirmation such
as Bayesianism.
The preceding discussion has shown that these judgments are ill-founded.
Hypothetico-deductivism is, first of all, not hopeless: the alleged refutations
can be rebutted, not without considerable efforts and sophistication, but still in
an elegant and accessible way. In that context, it is notable that the falsification-
ist line of reasoning also plays an important role in the resolution of the tacking
paradoxes. Limitations of that approach occur, of course, when unobservable
quantities come into play. To obtain a hypothetico-deductive confirmation of
purely theoretical claims, we need strong bridge hypotheses that connect un-
observable quantities with their observable effects. On the other hand, this
problem affects all accounts of confirmation.
Second, Bayesian reasoning may be a very successful approach to quantifying
the degree of confirmation that a piece of evidence confers to a hypothesis, but
it is usually silent on the reasons that make scientists change their degrees of
beliefs. Hypothetico-deductive confirmation is linked much closer to epistemic
virtues that may be confirmation-conducive, such as the generation of successful
new predictions.
Third, the main idea of H-D, namely to check whether consequences of a
model or a theory are compatible with reality, is even a cornerstone of modern
statistical research where repeated testing of a data model is a main activity
(Popper 1934/71, Fisher 1956). This can both mean classical significance test-
ing in the social sciences and complex mathematical procedures that check, by
means of a series of statistical tests, whether the data are really independent,
normally distributed, have constant variance, etc. If all these predictions are
vindicated, the model is deemed statistically adequate; otherwise, it is rejected.
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Mayo (1996) has elaborated this line of reasoning into a general inductive phi-
losophy and stressed that statistical models are tentatively confirmed if they fit
the data reasonably, and if they have survived a (group of) severe test(s), in
line with the basic H-D intuition.
All this demonstrates that in spite of all its limitations, hypothetico-deductivism
has a wider scope than it is often believed, and stays alive and kicking.
A The Definition of a Relevant Model
This appendix presents an abridged definition of relevant models and content
parts following Gemes 2006. See Gemes 1994a for an elaborate syntactic for-
mulation, and Gemes 1997 for an elaborate semantic version.
Definition 7 An atomic well-formed form (wff) β is relevant to a wff α if and
only if there is some model M of α such that: if M ′ differs from M only in the
value β is assigned, M ′ is not a model of α.
Intuitively, β is relevant for α if at least in one model of α the truth value of
β cannot be changed without making α false. In other words, the truth value of
α is not fully independent of the truth value of β. Now we can define the notion
of a relevant model which assigns truth values to only the relevant atomic wffs:
Definition 8 A relevant model of a wff α is a model of α that assigns truth
values to all and only those atomic wffs that are relevant to α.
This account of a relevant model grounds the definition of content parts, and
thus, also Gemes’ and Sprenger’s accounts of hypothetico-deductive confirma-
tion.
Notes
1This endeavor must not be mistaken for spelling out the practical consequences of empiri-
cal (dis)confirmation, e.g. whether we should give up hypotheses with little empirical support,
see Hempel 1945/65.
2Whewell’s general account of confirmation is inductivist, not deductivist (Snyder 2006);
thus, the above quote is, although a lucid statement of the H-D idea, not representative of his
overall approach.
3Popper (1934/71, 198) states that he prefers the word corroboration to avoid confusion
with an inductivist understanding of ‘degree of confirmation’ that was very popular following
Carnap’s (1950) book ‘Logical Foundations of Probability’. I will, for the sake of simplicity,
consistently use the term ‘confirmation’.
4A variation of that idea will be used in section 5 for improving on standard formulations
of H-D confirmation.
5By contrast, Bayesian confirmation theorists tend to bite to bullet: the evidence confirmas
one of the conjoined hypotheses, and therefore also on the entire conjunction. However, they
are eager to point out that the paradox is mitigated because for reasonable measures of
confirmation, the irrelevant conjunction is (much) less confirmed than the relevant conjunct
(Hawthorne and Fitelson 2004).
6Grimes actually used the syntactic criterion of decomposing the consequens into its dis-
junctive normal form, not a model-theoretic account, but due to the strong similarity to
Gemes’ semantic account, I rephrase it in those terms.
7Gemes (1993, 486) actually suggests a slightly different version in order to meet Glymour’s
(1980b) criticism, but I have already suggested a rebuttal of this criticism so that we can adopt
a less strict formulation.
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